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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
lrr~\H

PARI(S C((\IP.A.XY, a Corporation,
Pia inti ff -Appellant,
Y~.

IROl\ C01;~'1,\'", a Body Corpor.ate
and Politi<·, and CEDAR CITY
CORPORAT10N, a ~lunicipal Corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Ko. 9540
and
No. 9753

APP·ELLANT'S BRIEF

This is a ~nit pursuant to ~ection 59-10-1-±, lTtah
Code Annotated, 193:~, for a refund of property taxes
illegally collectP< l fron1 plaintiff by Iron County; or in
the alternative, a reimbur~e1nent to plaintiff of said tax
payment from (;edar City Corporation, pursuant to a
provision in a "~arrant~~ deed wherein plaintiff transferred the El Esc.alante Hotel and underlying realty at
Cedar City, lTtah, to Cedar City Corporation, which
deed provided that (~edar City 'vould assume and pay all
taxes la ,yfully levied upon or assessed against said
premises.
1

1
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DISPO~SITION"

IN LOWER

COl~RT

The court granted Iron County's motion to dis1niss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted .and a\varded a judg1nent of dismissal in favor of
Cedar City Corporation on an agreed state1nent of facts.
Plaintiff appeals from both judg1nents.
RELIEF SOUGHT

0~,~

APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judg1nent of dismissal in favor of Iron County and a judgment in its
favor .as a matter of la.\v, or that failing, a reinstaten1ent
of its con1plaint against Iron County in the trial court
for further proceedings; or in the alternative, a reversal
of the judgment of disn1i~~al in favor of Cedar City
Corporation .and judgment in favor of plaintiff as a
matter of law.
PRELI~IIN.l~RY

ST.A.TE:\IEXT

The brief of appellant covers both Case X o. 9540
and Case No. 9753. \\~en this la-\vsuit \\·as initially filed
in the trial court it included both respondent parties as
defendants and relief \Vas sought against said defendants
in the alternative, the causes of action .against each being
n1utually exelusive. The action against Iron County \vas
concluded in the trial court approxin1ately one year before the .artion \Vas coneluded against Cedar City Corporation. As a rPsult, t"·o separatt• appeals bec.ame
n<)ePssary, and upon perfeetion of the second appeal, an
order of consolidation "~.as entered in this court. In the
Staten1ent of Faets, nonP of \\Thich \\Tere in issue, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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<·itations to th0 t"·o records \Vill be distinguished by
plaeing an a.~teri~k follo\\"ing the record citations from
Case No. 97;)3 involving Cedar C~ity Corporation.
STATEMENT· OF FACTS
J>laintiff is a Utah corp·oration, Iron County, a body
corporate and politic and a politieal subdivision of the
State of lTtah, and (~edar City Corporat~on is a municipal
corporation organized and existing by virtue of the· laws
of the State of Utah. All three entities were duly constitute·d as such during all times mentioned herein. On
January 1, 1958, plaintiff was the record and actual
owner of t~he El Escalante Hotel, together with all furniture and fixtures and underlying realty, at Cedar City,
Iron County, State of lTtah. On January 31st of that year,
and prior to the t~'{ levy for the ye.ar 1958, plaintiff transferred and eonveyed title to said hotel, furnishings and
underlying realty, by ''·"arranty deed to defendant, Cedar
City Corporation, a rnunicipality exempt from taxation
pursuant to thP lTtah State Constitution. (R. 1) and
(R. 21)*
The \Y.arranty deed transferred title to the hotel
and underlying realty to Cedar City Corporation free
of all liens and encurnbrances, except as specifically
contained therein, and Cedar City Corporation .also accepted said property subject to the following covenant:
"'All taxes and all assessinents, general and
special, .and all installments of assessments lawfully levied upon or assessed against the premies
hereinbefore described which become due and p·ayable subsequent to the date hereof, which taxes
and assessments the grantee (Cedar City CorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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por.ation) hereby assu1nes and agrees to pay."
(R. 2) (R. 12-15, 21)~
As the record owner of said hotel and underlying
realty on January 1, 1958, the .ad valoren1 tax assessment and levy for that year was made and processed
in the naine of plaintiff, and plaintiff .also received the
valuation and tax notices on ~aid property. The total
assessed valuation for the year 1958 on the El Escalante
Hotel building, the underlying realty and the furniture
and fixtures, \vas $110,670. That valuation \vas subjected
to a 64 1nill levy, making the t.ax for the year 1958 the
sum of $7 ,082.88. On or about ~ ovember 26, 1958, plaintiff paid the Iron County Treasurer, without protest,
the 1958 taxes assessed and levied against said prope·rty
in the total sum of $7,082.88. (R. 2) (R. 11, 22) *
Thereafter, and based upon Cedar City Corporation's covenant and obligation under the \Varranty deed
to pay all taxes and a~~sessn1ents la\Yfully levied or assessed against said pre1nisr~ \Yhich hecan1e due and
payable subsequent to ,January 31, 1958, plaintiff requested reimburse1nent of ~aid tax pay1nent fro1n Cedar
City Corporation. By letter dated X ove1nber 11, 1959,
(~edar City c·orporation adYi~t>d plaintiff that it refused
to 1nake ~uc:h rein1burse1nent. (R. 16, 22) *
1

Plaintiff .also 1nade \Yritten application for a refund
of said taxe~ to the Board of County Connnissioners of
Iron Count)· on or about July 30, 1959, acting pursuant
to Seetion 59-10-14, 1:tah Code .A.nnotated, 1953, which
provides in part, as follo\vs :
~'Any

taxes, interest and costs paid more
than once, or erroneously or illegally collected,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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may, by order of the board of county eoinrnissioners be refunded h~~ the county treasurer * * •' '.
Plaintiff's application to the Board of County Commis~ioners of Iron (~ounty 'Yas denied on or about September 17~ 1959, on the ground said taxes had been lawfully
as~e~~Pd, levied and collected. (R. 2)
Follo,ving the refusal of Cedar City Corporation to
n1ake reimburse1nent under the provision in the 'varranty
deed, and the denial of plaintiff's application for a refund by the Board of County Commissioners of Iron
Count~·, plaintiff con1n1enced suit against both parties
seeking relief against Iron County on the ground said
taxes were erroneous 1~~ or illegally collected, and, in
the alternative, against Cedar City Corporation on the
ground said taxes 'vr re collected pursuant to la,vful
assessment and levy.

ARGUMENT
POIX1 I.
1

THE PROPERTY TAXES PAID BY UTAH
PARKS CO~fP AX\~ TO THE IRON COlTKTY
TREASl-rRER ON THE EL ESCALANTE HOTEL AND UXDERLYING REAL~TY FOR THE
\'"I1~AR 1958 \"VERE ERRONEOlTSLY AND ILLEGALL )T COLLECTED AXD S I-I 0 TTL D
THEREFORE BE REFUND,ED BY IRON
COUNTY PlTRSlTANT TO SE·CTION 59-10-14,
l ... TAH CODE .L\NXOTATED, 1953.
In vie"T of the trial court's order granting Iron
County's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, this
court on rev-ie"~ is obliged to survey the allegations set
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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forth therein in the light n1ost favorable to plaintiff
and to indulge in its favor all reasonable inferences as
to proof that may be adduced thereunder. It is the
policy of this court to be reluctant to turn a party out
of court 'vithout trial .and it can be done justifiably only
if the party could not in any· event establish a right to
recover. King Bros., Inc. rs. r~tah Dry Kt7n Company,
________ l~ tah ( 2d) ________ , 37 -t- P. ( 2d) 25-1, (1962).
Plaintiff's theory of an erroneous and illegal collection by Iron County under the provisions of Section
59-10-14, lTtah Code Annotated, 1953, is predicated upon
the exen1ption status afforded Cedar ( ity Corporation
by Article 13, Section 2, of the Constitution of l . . tah,
upon all tangible property o\vned by the said Cedar
City Corporation.
1

1

That Section provides in part:
"All tangible vroperty in the state, not exen1pt under the la\\·8 of thP l;nited States, or under
this constitution, ~hall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be a~rertained as provided by la,v.
The property of the ~tate, counties, cities, to"~s.
~ehool district~, n1unicipal corporations and public libraries, lots 'Yi th building~ thereon used exclusively for either religiou~ "Torship or charitable
purposes, and plare~ of burial not held or used
for privat<-~ or eorporate bPn~~fit, ~hall be exe1npt
fron1 taxation."
The exen1pt ~tatu~ of property <nYned by municipal
corporations, or other puhlic entitie~, for the entire
taxable year, is not que~tioned. ThP difficulty arises in
this 0ase fro1n the faet that thP transfer of the property
involved, fron1 a taxablP grantor to an exen1pt grantee,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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orenrred during· thP taxable year. ThP tax status of
that property undPr ~urh a transf0r, i~ the real crux
of this la"'"suit.
Constitutional Pxernption from taxation as a basis
for refund of taxes pajd to a county on a voluntary
ba~i~, on the theory the c-ollection was illegal, is not
unprecedented in this ~tate. The point 'va~ ruled upon
in Neilson vs. Sa1lJJefr ( 1 ounty, 40 Utah 560, 123 P. 334,
(1912). There an action 'vas co1nmenced against Sanpete
County to recover taxes 'vhich had been voluntarily paid,
on the ground the assessinPnt, levy .and collection of the
tax "'"as illegal and invalid. The tax was upon certain
real Psta te mortgages for the years 1907, 1908 .and 1909.
Prior to 1906 the legislature "'"as authorized by the State
Constitution to provide for taxation of mortgages. However, in that ~. ear the Constitution 'vas amended to eliminate and exPmpt 1nortgages from taxation. The taxpayer alleged that since the mortgages were exempt from
taxation hy the State Constitution, the taxes assessed
and levied thereon 'vere illegal and void. The Supreme
Court agreed. It also held that the proper recourse for
recover~~ was pursuant to the voluntary refund statute
and that payment under protest was unnecessary.
It seems ch•ar from the holding in the NeiJlson case
that if pr-operty enjoys a tax exempt status during the
entire taxable year, any attempt .at assessment, levy or
collection of the tax thereon would be illegal and void,
and that a refund from a Board of County Commissioners under the voluntary refund statute, upon proper
demand therefor, would be mandatory. In this regard
the only m aterial variation between the Neilson case and
1
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the present case is the fact that the exempt entity did
not .acquire the property until January 31, 1958, one
n1onth after January 1, 1958, the date upon which the
County Assessor must assess all property subject to
taxation to the person by 'vhom it is owned and at its
value on that date (Section 59-5-+, Utah Code Annotated,
1953), and one month after the inchoate tax lien had
attached to S'aid property. (Section 59-10-3, Utah ·Code
Annotated, 1953). Therefore, it must be determined
whether the acquisition of title to the hotel property by
Cedar City Corporation on January 31, 1958, \vould
defeat the application of the l\r eilson holding, and prevent plaintiff from making a recovery from Iron County.
See also Wey vs. Salt Lake City, 35 l~tah 504, 101 P.
381 (1909).
There appears to be two arguments under Utah
law for concluding that the collection of the tax in this
case hy Iron County \v-as illegal and void and that a refund fro1n the County should be allo\ved:
T he inchoate lien created by statute on J anuary 1, 1958, at the time of assessment never matured
into a valid and enforceable lien prior to acquisition of
title to the property by the exempt grantee;
( 1)

1

( 2) The title to property transferred to an exempt
entity in r;tah is subject to taxes onl~~ \Vhen said taxes
have been both lawfully asses~ed and la,vfully levied
ag-ainst th(l property prior to acquisition by tl1e exempt
entity.
Nu1nerous eas.es have held that the validity of an
inchoate lien \vhich attached to property on a given date
provided by statute is \Vholly dependent upon a subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sequent lawful levy. ThP lien 1natures and becomes enforePable only after a la,vful lev~r on the theory of a
rPlation back to the statutory lien date. Thus, by virtue
of the propert~r pa~sing into tax exempt hands before the
levr takes place, the attempted levy and subsequent collPction, if any, of' the tax, haH no legal effect. It is
eolnplPtel~r void.
~ o tax lien ever matures.
This is
bPeau~0 the crPation of a valid tax lien p-resupposes the
existence of a susceptible subject of taxation at every
~tage of the process of creation.
The principle of relation back was applied and
follo,Yed in G1~ll1uor 1)8. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932
( 190-l-). In that case .action was commenced to recover
taxe~ collected by the Treasurer of S:alt Lake County
and paid to Salt Lake Cit~r Corporation. The property
involved had be:en assessed pursuant to statute as of the
first ~fonday in Fe·bruary and, also pursuant to statute,
an inchoate lien attached at th.at time. On May 20, 1902,
a portion of the territory of Salt Lake City was disconnected and discharged from payment of taxes to Salt
L~ake City. Thereafter on July 28, 1902, the Salt Lake
City Council levied a tax on the property owned by
plaintiff ''-rhich 'Yas located in the disconnected .area. The
Treasurer contended that the tax for 1902, although not
levied until after the detachment of the territory from
the City, ''"'as, nevertheless, a valid unpaid lien upon
the property prior to detachment by virtue of the tax
lien statutes. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that
by disconnection the property was no longer subject to
a tax levy or any jurisdiction whatever by the City and
the property involved never became subject to the tax
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lien contended for by the County Treasurer by virtue
of the state taxation statutes. The court cites with approval the rule that no tax or assess1nent can exist so
a.s to become a lien or encumbrance upon real property
until the amount thereof is ascertained .and determined,
and then states :
''Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes
a city tax does not become a lien on real estate
until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied,
in pursuance of section~ 2:-~9, :2fj9-±; but \Yhen the
rate is so fixed, the a1nount deter1nined and levied,
a lien on each tract of real estate assessed by
the assessor .attaches, by relation, for the amount
of the tax thereon 'as of the first Monday of
February' preceding the levy. (Citing cases).
~·The ei ty council \vas not authorized, either
under the Constitution or by the provisions of the
Revised Statutes, to levy a tax, except on property
\vithin its corporate lin1it~, and .any levy upon
property not \Y"ithin such li1nits is \vithout authority and void. As no lien can exist for taxes illegally· levied, the appellanfs (trea~urer's) contention in respect to the lien clain1ed in this ca8e is
untenable."
The relation bac:k }lrinciple \\-as al8o Inentioned in
Anson rs. f}l!isou, 10-! taah 57ti~ 1-10 P. (:2d) 653 (19-i3).
In that case .an action to quiet title to property \vas
connnenced and Salt Lake Cit~~ \Va~ 1nad(• a party defendant on the ground it clai1ned an interest in the
propert~~ h~~ virtue of a ~pecial a8~es~1nent \Yhich it
clai1ned constituted a lien on the property.
()n thP principle of relation back, the court said:

·· ... .a valid lien \\-ill not arise fron1 an invalid
levy and assess1nent. ..Although it 1nay be that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"·hen a tax is subsequently properly levied the
lien 1nay relate back to the 1st day of January
of the year in \vhich the proper levy should l1ave
been ma(lP.''
A case si1nilar on its n1aterial facts to the one before
u:-; on the question of relation back is State vs. Snoho1nish
Couu t.11, 71 \\T ash. 320, 128 P. 667 ( 191:2). In that case the
State of vVashington COIIlmenced action to cancel tax
eertificates and to quiet title to lands \vhich it had
purchased fro1n private O\vners as a site for the \\T ashington State Reformatory. A portion of the property
,\.a8 vurchased on May 8, 1907, .and two other parcels on
~\ugust 9, 1907. After purchase the Snohomish County
Treasurer issued delinquency certificates for failure to
pay the 1907 taxes in the name of the record o\vner as
of ~larch 1, 1907.
The State Constitution exempted .all property belonging to the State from taxation and the state statute
establi~hing the tax lien provided that taxes assessed
npon real property on I\I.arch 1st \vere a lien from that
date until paid. The levy did not take place until after
title to the property had passed to the State. The issue
,,·as \\·hether real estate in private ownership on March
1, 1907, but in public O\vnership \Vhen the taxes for that
year \Vere levied, was subject to the payment of such
taxes.
The court held that the statute declaring taxes
assessed upon real property \Vas a lien from ~Iarch 1st
of the year in \vhich they are levied, makes the lien
incipient and inchoate and becomes a mature and enforceSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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able lien as of that date only by relation back upon the
making of a valid levy.
In support of its holding the court cites the Utah
case of Gillmor vs. Dale, supra. The following language
at :page 669, states the doctrine clearly:
"Obviously the doctrine of relation presupposes a valid creation. It seems equally plain
that the ereation of a valid tax in1plies the existence of a susceptible subject of taxation at every
stage of the process of such creation. Since, on
general principles of public policy and by both
constitutional declaration and statutory enactment, lands "rhile held in public ownership are
exempt from taxation, the land here in question
'vas not, during any step in the proceedings creating the tax after August 9, 1907, 'vhen it passed
to the state, a susceptible subject of taxatioJL
It follo,vs that at that time the developing process
of imposing the tax as a valid creation was
arrested. * * * 'Lands acquired for public purposes during the period between the first and
final steps of taxation are exempt fron1 taxes
levied during the year in which they are acquired.'
Territory of Arizona vs. Perrin, 9 Ariz. 316, 320,
83 Par. 361, 362; United States v. Pierce County,
supra; Bannon vs. Burnes, supra; Gilhnor vs.
Dale, supra.
There is no dis tinction in this respect bet\\'een purrhases by the United States and purchases by the state or a 1nunicipality for strictly
public uses, as is sho,vn by the Louisiana .and Utah
e are constrained to hold
cases above cited.
that the statute (Retn. & Bal. Code Sec. 9235)
creating the lien as to real property taxes makes
the lien only incipient or inchoate on March 1st
to become a complete and enforceable lien as of
H

''r
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that date by relation only upon the making of .a
valid levy."
In support of this view, see also City of Portland
l'S. JlultHoJJutll County, 135 Or. .ffj9, 296 P. 48 (1931);
City and County of Denver et al. vs. Tax Research
l~ltreau, 101 Colo. 140, 71 P. (2d) 809 (1937) ~ City of
Lanrel vs. W cems, 100 Miss. 335, 56 So. -!51 (1911); and
Tlu£ted States rs. Certain Lands, 29 F. Sup·p. 92 (1939).
In L' tah the Count~v _r\sse~sor must, before April
15th of each year, assess all taxable p.roperty as of
January 1st (Section 59-5-+, U.C.A., 1953) ~ the tax becomes a lien against the property assessed as of that
day (Section 59-10-3, U.C.A., 1953); the county levy
occurs bet,ve·en the last ~fonday in July and the second
~[onday in August (Section 59-9-6, U.C.A., 1953); and
thereafter the County Tre·asurer furnishes the taxpayer
"~ith notice of the amount of tax assessed against him
(Section 59-10-10, l:J.C.A., 1953). In this c.ase the title
passed to Cedar City Corporation on Janua.ry 31, 1958,
prior to the tax levy and prior to notice to the plaintiff
of the amount of tax assessed against it. Under the
prineiple of the G.illntor case, supra, no valid tax lien
ever attached to the hotel property in 1958 and the levy
upon the property and collection of the true by Iron
County 'vas 'vithout authority, and, therefore, illegal and
void. \Vith no basis to relate the inchoate lien back to
.January 1st, the exempt status of the pToperty prevailed for the entire year and the holding in the Neilson
case, supra, would be applicable.
In this case plaintiff did not pay the taxes under
protest, pursuant to Section 59-11-11, Utah Code . A.nnoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tated, 1953. If payn1ent under protest was necessary
under the facts of this case, plaintiff concedes that it
has no remedy against Iron County. However, we believe the facts and circumstances of this case properly
qualify it for a refund under the voluntary payment
statute, Section 59-10-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Both provisions ·w·ere construed in detail in the
t·l eilson c:ase, supra. After a lengthy analysis of the
prope,r scope and application of each, the court concluded
that taxes assessed and levied upon exempt property,
even though in the regular manner, are absolutely illegal
and void, and are properly recoverable by the taxpayer
from the eounty pursuant to Section 59-10-14, U.C.A.,
1953.
The question of """'hether special taxes assessed by
a eity against exe1npt property 1nust be paid under protest \Vas before the court in lf'ey vs. Salt Lake City, 35
lT tah 504, 101 P. 381 (1901). In that case Salt L-ake
City levied a spe:cial tax on lands abutting on a street
to pay for the expense of paving and in1proving it. The
B,oard of Education O\vned land abutting on the street
and failed to pay the assess1nent. By statute all property
o\vned by the Board "~as exe1npt fron1 special taxes.
It later sold the property involved to the plaintiff "rho
filed suit against Salt Lake Cit~~ to annul the assessment
on the ground the property \Ya8 exempt fron1 the special
tax. The trial court granted judgn1ent to the plaintiff
.and on appeal the Supren1e Court affirn1ed.
Among its defenses the eity urged that if the propert~~ \Ya8 exe1npt from the assess1nent, the Board~s
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only remedy 'vas to pay the tax under protest and bring
aetion for a recovery pursuant to "That is now Section
10-7-39, lT. C1.A., 1953. rrhat p'rovision requires a taxpayer a~sessed 'vi th a special tax by a city or to,vn to
pa~r thP sa.Ine undPr protPst and file notice that he intends
to ~ue to re'cover the pay1nent. It further provides that
~uch re1nedy is exrlusive. The court, ho"\\'"ever, held that
~uch statute had no application \vhere the p-roperty involvPd 'vas exempt from the assessment.
Under the Gillmor principle no valid tax lien ever
attached to the property in the present case and, therefore, as .a 1natter of la.,v, it was not subject to taxation
for the year 1958. The exempt nature of the grantee,
\vho acquired the property after January 1st, but prior
to the levy, impressed that property \vith con1plete tax
in11nunity for the entire year and the collection thereof
\Ya~ illegal and void. Therefore, this case falls within
the holdings of the Neilson case and the W ey case as to
the nature of plaintiff's claim against Iron County, and
plaintiff is entitled to proceed against Iron County
under the voluntary pa)rn1ent statute. See also W il :iOn
rs. lVeber Couuty, 100 l~tah 141, 111 P. (2d) 147 (19-ll);
and Shea vs. State Tax CoJJunission, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.
(~d) 274 (1941).
It i~ true that in the Gillnzor c.ase the taxes 'vere
paid under protest. However, the issue of 'vhether or
not thP suit could have been eommenced and recovery
n1ade under the voluntary payment section 'vas never
considered or ruled upon. That case, therefore, does
not answer the question of 'vhether a recovery can be
made for such taxes not paid under protest.
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One final comment seems appropriate. The 'vord
"may'' in Section 59-10-14, U.C.A., 1953, does not ~How
a county commission any discretion in refunding taxes
illegally colle·cted. The Neilson case, supra, holds that
after a demand in 'vriting for the return of the tax
has been made, and the county commission refuses to
order a refund, the taxpayer may commence action to
recover the tax together with legal interest from the
date of the demand. The purpose of the '""ord "may"
in the refund statute is to provide the county commission
'vith an opportunity to refund the tax 'vithout the necessity of court action by the taxpayer to enforce such
a paynu:1nt. See also Wilson t;s. Weber County, supra
(\'T olfe, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part).

POINT II.
IX Ti fE AI~TERXATI,:--E TO POIXT I~ THE
PROPERTY TAXES PAID BY UTAH P~.\RKS
COl\lPANY TO THE IRON COUN"TY TREAS1~RER ON THE EL ESCAL~-\XTE HOTEL ~1\l"D
UNDERL YIXG R-EALTY FOR THE l~EAR
1958 \VERE LA\VFULL Y ASSESSED .A.XD
LE\'IED, .A.KD T HE R E F 0 R E THERE
SH01TLD BE A REil\IBl:R.SE~IEXT FRO~{
CEDAR ·CIT\~ CORPORATION PlTRSUAXT
TO ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE
\\-.-ARR.ANT1,. DEED.
Plaintiff's theory against Cedar Cit~T Corporation
is ba~ed upon the "rarra.nt~T deed covenant ""herein the
grantPe agrePd to pay .all taxes la,vfully assessed or
levied on the hotel property \vhieh becan1e subsequently
due and payable.
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If the Neilson and Gillnlor cases, supr:a, are controlling in this la\vsuit, under the analysis heretofore
presented for recovery against Iron County, there would
be no lawful assessment or levy in this case, and no
right of recovery fron1 Cedar City Corporation under
the deed. Ho\vever, there is .a decision froin the United
States Supreme Court which, if controlling, would appear
to allo'v recovery from l~edar City Corporation. In
[luited States rs. Alabama, 313 l~ .. s. 274, 85 L.Ed. 1327,
61 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1941), the court held that the transfer
of property fron1 a taxable grantor to the United Sta.tes
following the tax day but prior to the day of levy did
not transfer the title t:o the United Sitates free of the
inchoate lien. In that case the U nit.ed States filed a
suit to quiet title to certain property in Ala.b.ama. The
state claimed that tax liens attached to said property
on October 1, 1936, for state and county taxes for 1937.
The l7nited States had obtained title to the three tracts
of land involved on October 1, 1936, Dece1nber 10, 1936,
and :Jlarch 10, 1937. In Alaba1na, fro1n and after October
1st of each year property becomes assessable .and the
state has an inchoate lien thereon for the pay1nent ·of
all taxes until such taxes are paid. Thus the process of
a.sses~nnent for 1937 com1nenced on October 1, 1936.
The government claimed that the lands could not
he taxed because when the l~nited States acquired title,
the amount of taxes had not been ascertained as the
values had not been assessed and the rate of taxation
had not been fixed. It further claimed that the lien
n1atured under such circumstances only when the taxes
had been ascertained by completion of levy and assessSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment. The Supreme Court refused to accept this argument. Beginning at page 279 the court states:
'"The~re

is no question however, as the Government concedes, that the state statute purports
to impose a lien as of October 1, 1936, for the
taxes which by the process of assessment "Tere
to become payable for the tax year 1937. October
first is fixed as the tax day, and as of that day
owners are to make their returns, values are to
be fixed and the taxes laid. There is no question
that tl1e State thus undertakes to create an inchoate lien upon the lands as of the tax day, a
lien \vhich is to be effective for the amount of
the taxes for the ensuing year as these are fixed
by the defined statutory method. This lien by the
state la\v is made effective not only as against
the owners on the tax day but also as against
subsequent mortgagees and purchasers. * * * We
find nothing in the Federal Constitution \vhich
invalidates such a statutory schen1e. Subsequent
lienors and purchasers have due notice of the tax
liability imposed as of the tax day and of the process of assess1nent, and that liability, when its
a1nount is definitely ascertained, relates back
to the day specified.''
The court continues on page

~81, .a~

follo\\TS:

"* * * The Governn1ent brings this suit in
the vie"'" that it is entitled to have a 1narketable
title and it seeks to ren1ove the liens in question
as clouds upon that title \Vhich would interfere
\Yi th the disposition of thP lands in the future.
From that standpoint the Government as~ks .a
decree declaring the invalidity of the liens and
enjoining the State fro1n asserting any claim in
the lands either adverse to the United States or
to its successors in title. We think that the
lTnited States is not entitled to that relief. The
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LTnited States took the eonveyance with kno\vledge of the state law fixing the lien a.s of October
1st. That la\v in creating such liens for the taxes
~ubsPquently assessed in due course and making
the1n effective as against subsequent purchasers
did not contravene the Constitution of the United
~·Hates and we perceive no reason \vhy the United
States, albeit protected \vith respect to proceedings ag.ainst it without its consent, should stand,
so far a.s the existence of the liens is concerned,
in any different position from that 'Of other purchasers of lands in Alabama \vho take conveyances on and .after tl1e specified tax date. It is
familiar practice for grantees who take title in
sue] 1 circumstances to see t hat provision is made
f·or the payment of taxes and the GoveTninent
could e:asily have protected itself in like 1nanner.
Finding no constitutional infirmity in the state
legislation, we think that the liens should be held
valid."
1

Cedar City Corporation acquired title to the property involved herP \vith the san1e notice and kno\vledge
the l . . nited State~ had in the AlalJanza ease ,,~ith respect
to the tax day. Both \Vere a\vare of the statutory provi~ion~ "\Yhich i1nposed an inchoate lien on all taxable
propert~T on Raid day and that the taxing authority, if
not legally restricted fro1n doing so, would, in due course,
perfect the lien through subsequent levy, and when
ascertained "\\Tould relate the liability bac~k to the tax day.
The scope of constitutional exen1ption of property
from taxation in this state, \Vhere ae<1nisition is n1ade
by a public entity during the ta:xahle year, has never
been con1pletely defined. l~ nder the rationale of the
(lilhnor case, supra, it appears that the critical point
in the taxing process is the date of levy, and that if an
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exempt entity acquires the property before that date the
taxing process is stopped~ however, if it acquires the
property subsequent to that date the tax lien survives
the transfer. Nevertheless, in Gillnlor the power to tax
\Yas lost be~ause the property \vas disconnected from
the territory of the taxing power, not because it \Vas
acquired by the state or one of its political subdivisions.
In addition, neither that case nor -any other l;tah case
to our kno\vledge, has considered the effect of statutory
notice to an exempt grantee, upon its acquisition of
pr·operty fro1n a taxable grantor during the taxable
year, of an inchoate lien impressed on said property
by the tax day provision. Such kno\\'ledge on the part
of the lTnited States \vas the primary reason for the
holding in the Alaba1na decision, supra. In our Yiev{,
the Supren1e Court's analysis in that case deserves consideration here.
The lTtah Supreme Court recognized that there are
liinitations 'On tl1e scope of constitutional tax imn1unity
for public entities in State rs. Salt Lnke Co·unty, 96
lTtah 464, 85 P. (2d) 851 (1938). There the county bid
in certain property for delinquent taxes during the time
''"·hen the property \Vas mortgaged to the state.

After

the final tax sale, the state acquired title by a "!"arranty
deed front the Inortgagor and thereafter com1nenced
quiet title procPedings against the county. The eourt
held that tl1e tax lien survived the arquisition of title
by the state and the

state'~

constitutional exen1ption from

taxation \Vould not apply.

One issue presented \Yas

\vhether the c.onstitutional exemption of state property
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from taxation could be made to cover property \\~hich
'\vas in private o'\vnership at the tin1e it was assessed
f·or taxation, the tax levied, the tax lien attached and
the property sold for unpaid taxes. Under these cireuJnHtances the court concluded that the state acquired
only the ti tie that its grantor had at the ti1ne of transfer
by deed, .and this was a title encumbered by· taxes theretofore lawfully assessed and levied against the property.
To hold otherwise '\vould constitute abatement of taxes,
not exernption of taxes.
~0e

also State vs. Duchesne County, 96 l7tah 482,
~5 P. (2d) 860 (1938), and the annotation in 158 ALR
beginning at p.age 563.
\Vhile the facts in the s.alt Lake County case, supra,
are readily distinguishable from those present here, and
the court speaks of the levy as the critical date for
p:..;tabli~hing a valid lien, the case does illustrate that
constitutional ta..x immunity for public entities i:--; not
absolute for .all acquisitions, and that unless property
~~ rlearl~T exempt it cannot escape the burden of taxation.
It also clearly sets forth the requiren1ent of strict con~truction against exemptions of property from taxation
under the lTtah Constitution .and that all doubts must
be resolved against the exemption. lTnder such circumstances, and even though the present l!tah la'v appears
contrary, the ratronale of the Alabanz.a case has been
presented in this la,Ysuit. It would appear that the
application of that decision 'vould 1nake the entire taxing process in this case legal in all respects. In that
event that collection of the tax by the County 'vould
be lawful under a valid levy and as~essn1ent, and a reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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covery under the vvarranty deed from Cedar City Corporation \vould be proper.
It is true th.a.t there is no provision in the warranty
deed \vherein Cedar (~ity Corporation explicitly agrees
to reimburse plaintiff for taxes pai~d to Iron County.
Neither is there a provision in t~he deed expressly requiring Cedar City to pay the taxes directly to Iron
County. The deed me~rely requires the City to assume
and pay s.aid taxes. The means of pay1nent are not
spelled out. Therefore, if the taxes on the hotel "~ere
la,,~fully assessed and lawfully levied, elements Vi,,.hich are
indispensable for plaintiff to recover fro1n Cedar City
Corporation, then the payment by plaintiff to Iron
County and reimbursement from Cedar ·City, or in the
alternative, a direct pay1nent to the Colmty by Cedar
City, vvould both constitute performance of the clear
jntention of the parties to the deed.
And, if Cedar (ii t:~ had refused to pay the tax, plaintiff, as record O\\'"Iler on J·anuary 1, 1958, \Vas under
somP risk in not doing so by virtue of Section 59-5-12,
U.C.A., 1953, \Yhich provides that \vhere the name of
the O\Yner of .any property is kno\Yn, or appears of record,
it n1ust be assessed to such name, and .also by Yirtue of
Section 59-10-1, U.C.A., 1953, \\'"hich provides that every
tax has the effert of a judg1nent against the person,
and PVPr:'" lien created thereby has the force and effect
of .an execution duly leYied again~t all personal property
of the delinquent. See also the concurring opinion in
!Iayes vs. Gibbs, 110 1Ttah 54, 169 P. (2d) 781, 788 (1946),
where Justice Wolfe points out th~at Section 59-10-1
see1n~ to make the tax a debt against the individual
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o'vning the property and a lien on his personal property
rather than a charge against the property alone.
T'he possible legal effect of the foregoing statutory
provisions, together 'vith plaintiff's contractual rights
,vith Cedar City Corporation under the deed, provide it
'vith ample basis for paying the tax and then securing
reimbursemPnt for the taxes so paid. See Franklh1 Bwilding & Loan Co. vs. Peppard, 97 Utah 483, 93 P. (2cl)
92;) ( 1939).
\Ve recognize that Cedar City Corporation's o'vner~hip of property is all that is necessary to remove it
from a taxable status even though the City may use the
property in a nongovernmental capacity such as operating a hotel. Spr~ngville vs. Jensen, 10 Utah 351, 37 P.
577 (1894), and Duchesne vs. State Tax Contmissi,on,
104 L"tah 365, 1-tO P. (2d) 335 (1943). Therefore, plaintiff n1akes no attempt to recover from Cedar City on the
nature of the use to which it has put the property involved.
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The holdings of this court in Neilson and Gillmor,
supra, may well be dispositive on the question of the
leg.ali ty of the taxes involved in this case. In that event
plaintiff's remedy is against Iron County. However if
the levy and lien are valid against the prop~erty involved
in this ease for the year 1958 regardless of the transfer
to an exempt grantee, under the views expressed in the
Alabarn~a case, supra., it is our contention that Cedar
City Corporation should be required to live up to its
covenant under the deed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRlTAN P. LE,TERICH
A. l~. ~fiXER
HO\\"'"ARD F. CORAY
SCOTT l\I. :JIATHESOX

GARY L. THEl~RER
40-! Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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